This paper investigates whether there is a discrepancy between the stated and actual aims in biomechanical research, particularly with respect to hypothesis testing. We present an analysis of one hundred papers recently published in The Journal of Experimental Biology and Journal of Biomechanics, and examine the prevalence of papers which (a) have hypothesis testing as a stated aim, (b) contain hypothesis testing claims that appear to be purely presentational (i.e. which seem not to have influenced the actual study), and (c) have exploration as a stated aim. We found that whereas no papers had exploration as a stated aim, 58% of papers had hypothesis testing as a stated aim. We had strong suspicions, at the bare minimum, that presentational hypotheses were present in 31% of the papers in this latter group.
Introduction
In this paper, we attempt to determine to what extent there is a discrepancy between the stated and actual aims of research in biomechanics (i.e. the application of the theories and methods of mechanics to the study of living things). In particular, we are 1 1 In the interests of balance, we should add that a fourth respondent, who classified two of his best papers as hypothesis testing, wrote: "I have surprised myself a little [in answering your questionnaire]! I have always imagined that my science had a very large measure of floundering in the dark, but an analysis of three of my favourite papers suggests otherwise. But perhaps it is because the work was so sharply focused from the start that it yielded the more satisfactory publications." Note, however, that what scientists consider to be their best work may be influenced by the citation count. And citation count may be affected by whether the paper claims to test a hypothesis. These matters are worthy of empirical study, but are beyond the scope of the present paper.
It should be noted from the start that it is normally rather easy to present research as testing a hypothesis (or hypotheses) even when it was not really designed for that purpose. Imagine that a social scientist conducts a study on how salary varies with respect to educational achievement in the UK, and that she relies on questionnaires in order to collect data. But now imagine she notices something that she did not expect, namely that quality of handwriting correlates inversely with educational achievement.
When she comes to presenting her research, she might easily suggest that it was designed to test a hypothesis (or hypotheses) concerning handwriting; and this might be a good strategy to improve probability of publication. (Indeed, she might even suggest that she gathered qualitative data to increase the amount of handwriting on each questionnaire.) 2 Alas, however, her readers would be misled about how she worked if they took her paper at face value.
Such concerns have been raised before, of course. Popper (1983, (47) (48) , for instance, once bemoaned the inductive style that he saw as prevalent in biological research:
Nowhere is the power of the inductivist tradition as conspicuous as in what I have called 'the inductive style' -a certain manner of reporting one's researches which is still the traditional way of writing in a number of biological journals, although by now it has almost disappeared from the journals of physics and chemistry.
2 Similar examples are easy to construct, and are not peculiar to social science. Here's a medical one: a researcher wishes to investigate how effective a drug is in treating a specific condition, but is told by the drug manufacturer, subsequent to the completion of her study, that all the pills she was provided with were defective. In an attempt to prevent all her hard work going to waste, she might present the study as testing a hypothesis about the placebo effect.
The basic idea which inspires the inductive style is this: we must keep carefully to our actual observations, and must beware of theorizing; for this may make us acquire theoretical prejudices which may easily bias or taint our observations if we are not very careful...
[N]o doubt those trained to write in this way are unaware that this laudable and apparently safe idea is the mistaken result of a prejudice -worse still, of a philosophical prejudice -and of a mistaken theory of objectivity...
[W]e cannot avoid or suppress our theories, or prevent them from influencing our
observations; yet we can try to recognize them as hypotheses and formulate them explicitly, so that they may be criticized. not especially aimed at testing specific hypotheses (whether or not it ought to be). 6 So to the extent that it is dissimilar, we might expect that this is as a result of involvement in, and interaction with, biological scientists. Ultimately, however, this study is interesting in its own right in so far as it provides evidence of a peculiar form of emphasis (or even misrepresentation) in biomechanical publications.
Method
For our investigation we selected two journals that we consider to be among the most in subject matter we relied on the judgement of Alexander, who has fifty years experience in biomechanical research and has written several textbooks in the field.
We each classified the papers independently, using three categories for stated aims:
With respect to the classification of H, we decided that the philosophical question of what genuinely counts as a test, or an attempt to test, is beside the point. We are interested in whether scientists attempt to present their work as testing a hypothesis (or hypotheses), and therefore only in what they perceive to fit the bill. This mitigates in favour of allowing both 'hypothesis' and 'testing' a broad scope. As such, we agreed that professed attempts to 'verify', 'validate', or 'confirm' all counted as professed attempts to test. Furthermore, we agreed that 'a hypothesis' might be a prediction, a theory, or even a model (e.g. a computer model). Finally, uses of the verb 'hypothesize' were typically understood to imply that the paper sought, in part if not in whole, to test something. Exceptions were only made when 'hypothesize' was used to state a working assumption, e.g. a theory that was taken for granted in the execution of the research.
We also decided that we would classify a paper as H if there was any mention of hypothesis testing (using the broad understanding explained above) as an aim, even as subsidiary and among many. But we did not, however, give such a classification if the paper claimed only that some collected data bore on a hypothesis (e.g. by 'confirming', 'supporting', 'corroborating', or 'disconfirming' it). Recognizing that there would still be differences in classifications, we also agreed that we would discuss these in order to resolve them, when they occurred, and leave open the option of introducing a 'disagreement' category for cases in which we were unable to reach a considered consensus.
Papers put into the H category would be subsequently examined, again independently in the first instance, in order to see in how many instances we would each classify the stated aim of hypothesis testing as merely presentational (P), rather than actual. In short, we were looking for cases in which the stated aim (of H) did not match the actual aim. We agreed that a P classification would be given if any one hypothesis testing statement in the paper appeared to be presentational.
However, it soon transpired, when we compared and discussed our results, that there were several cases in which we thought that it was appropriate to register a serious suspicion (S) that a hypothesis was presentational, without giving a full P classification. (The difference between the two classifications is in estimated evidence levels. We classified a paper as P if we thought there was strong evidence of the presence of at least one presentational hypothesis. We used an S classification if we thought there was some evidence, but not strong evidence, of such a hypothesis. The difference could be expressed numerically, by an appropriate function, e.g. a probability function, ranging from zero to one. Roughly, a P classification corresponds to a value above 0.8. An S classification corresponds to a value in the interval [0.5, 0.8].) We will discuss some specific examples in the next section.
We would also like to emphasize that we erred on the side of caution in classifying papers as involving presentational hypotheses (P), so as to avoid false positives (at the risk of an increase in false negatives). If either of us had doubts about whether a P classification was warranted after the discussion phase of our data analysis, in any particular case, then we only registered a suspicion (S) at most. (Thus if one of us scored a paper as P, and the other scored it as S, it would not have a final P classification.) Furthermore, a suspicion must have been agreed as reasonable by us both, in order for an S classification to be awarded. (Hence if one of us scored a paper as S, and the other scored it as neither S nor P, then it would not have a final S classification.)
Clearly the judgements required were difficult, and we were error prone in making them. We could not know the minds of the authors! However, we could isolate cases
where (1) Popper's (1959 Popper's ( , 1983 ) measure of corroboration, the workhorse of which is P(e, h & 
Results
In total, we examined one hundred papers. We took fifty papers from volume 41 (2 & During our deliberations, we encountered two unanticipated problems in a small number of cases. The first of these concerned how we should classify a paper which stated that its aim was to 'test whether' something is the case (rather than 'test the hypothesis' that it is, or is not, the case). Almbro and Kullberg (2008) , for example, state that they "tested whether the flight performance of an insect … is affected by variation in body mass due to feeding." This was a particularly interesting case, for us, because we were both confident that the paper would be given a P classification were it to be given an H classification (and one of us classified it as H & P in the first instance, but the other classified it as O). This is because the authors already knew by their own admission elsewhere in the paper (a) that the change in body mass of the insects in question after feeding could be as great as 50%, and (b) that previous studies had shown that far smaller increases in mass in the relevant area of the body resulted in decreased flight performance. (It is also pretty obvious by analogy, even to a layman, that a 50% increase in the mass of an aircraft after loading, roughly concentrated in the belly area, would have an effect on its flight performance!) So it appears that they really intended to quantify the (negative) change in flight performance due to increased body mass after feeding, rather than to test the hypothesis that any change (positive or negative) occurs. (And they were interested in the extent of the change, we think, with respect to the 'fitness' of the organism in question when it comes to escaping predators.) So we both agreed that Almbro and Kullberg (2008) did not intend to test what they say they tested, but not that they presented their work as testing a hypothesis. Rowbottom thought that they were clearly making out that that they were testing either the hypothesis that "flight performance... is affected by variation in body mass due to feeding" or its negation.
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He also thought that it was reasonably clear that they purported to be testing the former (by the context). Alexander, on the other hand, maintained that there is a significant difference between 'testing whether p' and 'testing the hypothesis that p'.
Eventually we decided that we should not classify that paper as H, in line with our charitable policy of favouring false negatives (especially for S and P) over false positives. We mention this issue here, however, because if Rowbottom is correct then presentational hypotheses are more prevalent than our results suggest.
The second problem, which was related, occurred when authors said that they wished to 'determine whether', rather than 'test whether', something is the case. Rowbottom originally gave H verdicts for some of these papers, whereas Alexander gave only O verdicts. After discussion, we agreed that O verdicts were preferable because there was not even any explicit mention of testing. Again, this was in line with our policy of favouring false negatives.
A summary of our overall results follows: Second, Clark and Summers (2007) studied hagfishes, primitive chordates which have tooth plates but no true jaws. They suspected that these tooth plates may be inferior to jaws, and considered why this might be. They reported observations on more than one species of hagfish and advanced the hypothesis that the two closely related species are similar (in relevant respects). However, this is a common assumption in biology, and we regard its formal expression here as presentational. (We only know they are closely related species, arguably, because they are similar!)
Third and finally, Bates et al (2008) 'hypothesized' that a part of the echolocation call of a species of bat would be vulnerable to interference from conspecifics using nearby frequencies, and that bats would therefore have a "jamming avoidance response" (or "JAR"). But the problem of interference between bats using similar frequencies is well known, and it is inevitable that an echolocation system will be jammed by nearby frequencies from another source. If we add that bats function in an unimpaired fashion in large groups, it becomes obvious that they must have a JAR. Bates et al (2008) claim that: "Taken together, the existing observations of changes in broadcast frequency by bats flying in groups or responding to playback in the field do not provide conclusive evidence for a JAR in bats." However, their standard for "conclusive evidence" seems entirely unrealistic, especially since they admit elsewhere in the piece that:
[ Furthermore, Griffin et al (1963) had long ago, in a paper to which Bates et al (2008) refer, noted that: "Often echolocation is complicated by orientation sounds from other bats nearby."
We also strongly suspected the presence of (one or more) presentational hypotheses will behave as observed in previous studies. If the "working hypothesis" was intended as a formal hypothesis, it is presentational. However, we gave the authors the benefit of the doubt and did not register the paper as H.
Discussion
Our most striking findings, over the one hundred papers, are as follows. First, no papers had exploration as a stated aim. 9 Second, 58% of papers had hypothesis testing as a stated aim. Third, out of those papers which had hypothesis testing as a stated aim, approximately one third (31%) were strongly suspected, at least, of containing some purely presentational hypotheses. We will discuss these findings in turn.
The first finding is perhaps the most remarkable, because it indicates a strong bias in biomechanics against presenting work as the result of exploratory activity. That is, given our evidence from survey work, mentioned in the introduction, that biomechanists will privately admit that purely exploratory activity does lead to published work. Obviously there are two primary means by which this might happen:
on the one hand, authors may intentionally avoid any reference to exploration as an aim of their studies; and on the other, mentions of exploration may be filtered out by the refereeing process.
Recall that exploration appears to be directly opposed to hypothesis testing in the following sense: to look somewhere in the hope of finding something interesting does not require any hypotheses about what one will find, and does not involve the explicit intent to test of any hypotheses whatsoever (other, perhaps, than trivial non-scientific hypotheses of the form "We will find something interesting if we look at x"). Thus the evidence that biomechanists will avoid presenting their work as exploratory is consistent with (and arguably corroborates, in conjunction with the other findings) the view that hypothesis-testing work is up-valued. In short, to fail to present one's work as hypothesis-testing is not to rule out that it involved testing some hypothesis. But to present one's work as exploratory is to be explicit that the work was not aimed at testing some hypothesis (or hypotheses). (Needless to say, it is possible that exploratory work could be frowned upon independently of favouring hypothesistesting work. But admitting an exploratory strategy would not appear to be precluded by adopting the inductive style written of by Popper and Medawar, for example.)
The second finding is also noteworthy, in so far as it is not terribly plausible that well over half the work (worthy of reporting) that goes on in biomechanics in genuinely aimed at testing hypotheses. This may be highlighted by our finding, in a pilot study, that roughly 25% of forty papers in the final sample had data collection as a stated aim. 10 This would leave only 17% of papers that weren't based on hypothesis testing or collecting data; or, of course, exploration! Our suspicion is that hypotheses are often 'cooked up' in a highly proficient, and therefore quite undetectable, fashion. As we've explained, this is not difficult to do.
And the fact that hypotheses are sometimes 'cooked up' is illustrated by our final finding. Even if we err strongly on the side of caution and imagine that only half of our suspicions were justified -i.e. only half of the papers we classified as S actually contain presentational hypotheses -then our results still show that there were presentational hypotheses present in 12% of the papers that we examined. that their chances of publication (and/or funding) will be increased by presenting their work in a particular way, then many will do so even if do so is inaccurate. The practice might also have become entrenched somewhat through the apprentice-like system in which biomechanists are trained.
Selection may also, or instead, have occurred in the refereeing process. It would be interesting to discover how many of the papers we analysed were revised in response to comments from referees, and if the revisions ever led to the insertion of hypothesis testing talk that was not originally present. It would also be interesting to discover how many papers are rejected for failing to frame hypotheses for test. Alas, this would be a difficult empirical study to pull off; access to journal records, and particularly to unpublished referees' reports, would be required.
So are presentational hypotheses really a bad thing? Even if one rejects the view that prediction has more epistemic significance than accommodation -instead holding that how some data bears on a hypothesis is independent of when the data was collected (or when the hypothesis was considered), and even how the data was collected (provided the data is true/accurate) -it is difficult to see what advantage presentational hypotheses offer. To reject such a view is to think that whether an author intended to test a hypothesis (and designed an experiment for that express purpose), in gathering his/her data, is scientifically irrelevant. Hence the 'window dressing' would be unnecessary unless it served to draw attention to the paper's findings in a way that could not otherwise be achieved. It is highly doubtful that it does, because one may state that some data confirms or disconfirms (or corroborates or falsifies) some hypothesis without saying anything about the intent behind the experiment to collect that data (or behind any other activity by which the data became available). So to summarise, we believe that presentational hypotheses are at best unnecessary, and at worst (often) responsible for misleading readers about the significance of research findings (or specific data).
We have still not explained precisely why hypothesis-testing seems to have become 'up-valued' in biomechanics. One reasonably plausible story, prima facie, is that this is due, in part, to outside philosophical influence. For example, biomechanists (perhaps as a subset of biologists) may have been looking for a way to make their work appear manifestly scientific and adopted a hypothesis-testing mode of presentation on the basis of the emphasis that this received from the likes of Popper (who is perhaps the best known philosopher of science among scientists).
Alternatively, and less plausibly, perhaps many influential biomechanists became convinced that hypothesis-testing is at the heart of genuine science (and refereed the papers and proposals of others accordingly, influenced the views of their research students, and so forth). This is a fascinating historical question which awaits a definitive answer, and which would have to be the subject matter of a longer study.
